Remarks on Nash equilibria in mean field game models with a major player by Cardaliaguet, Pierre et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
02
81
1v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  7
 N
ov
 20
18
Remarks on Nash equilibria in mean field game models with a
major player
P. Cardaliaguet∗ M. Cirant† A. Porretta‡
November 8, 2018
Abstract
For a mean field game model with a major and infinite minor players, we characterize a
notion of Nash equilibrium via a system of so-called master equations, namely a system of
nonlinear transport equations in the space of measures. Then, for games with a finite num-
ber N of minor players and a major player, we prove that the solution of the corresponding
Nash system converges to the solution of the system of master equations as N tends to
infinity.
Introduction
The aim of this note is to discuss the model of a mean field game (MFG) with a major and many
minor players. Let us recall that MFGs describe Nash equilibrium configurations in differential
games with infinitely many small players.
MFG problems with a major player are differential games in which infinitely many small
players interact with a major one. This class of problems was first introduced by Huang in [17]
and later studied in various forms and different frameworks in several papers [2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10,
11, 13, 14, 18, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28]. In the literature, the notion of solution is often that of Nash
equilibria and, in the present paper, we will concentrate on this notion of solution. Let us point
out however that this is not always the case in the above quoted references: for instance, [2, 3]
(see also [24]) study Stackelberg equilibria (in which the major player announces in advance
his strategy); [13] deals with the (closely related) problem of principal-agents; [4] considers the
situation where the small agents cooperate to play a zero-sum game against the major player.
Concerning Nash equilibria in the framework of MFG with a major player, Carmona and
Zhu [11] point out that the notion is rather subtle and not trivial at all. In fact, [11] (and,
subsequently, [8] and [10]) propose a notion of Nash equilibrium which differs from the classical
construction of [25, 26] (see Proposition 6.2 of [11]). In the same papers, it is proved by the
authors that this definition yields ε-Nash equilibria for the N ` 1-players’ game in the linear
quadratic case. Very recently, Lasry and Lions [22] introduce a new equation (the master
equation with a major player, see equation (2) below) which could give rise to yet another
notion of solution. Finally, one could also wonder if the limit of games with finitely many
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players (including a major player) as the number of small players tends to infinity would not
give rise again to a different notion of solution. The purpose of this paper is to show that the
approach by Carmona and al. [8, 10, 11], the master equation of Lasry and Lions [22] and the
limit of Nash equilibria, as the number of small players tends to infinity, lead to the same Nash
equilibria.
To explain our result, let us start with the differential game with N minor players and
one major player, which we describe through the following PDE system; the value functions
associated with the N minor players are denoted by uN,i (i “ 1, . . . , N) while the value function
of the major player is uN,0. To simplify the discussion, we assume that the players have only
individual noises. The Nash system reads (in p0, T q ˆ Rd0`Nd) (see Section 1 below for the
notations):$’’’’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’’’’%
´BtuN,0 ´
Nÿ
j“0
∆xju
N,0 `H0px0,Dx0uN,0,mNx q `
Nÿ
j“1
Dxju
N,0 ¨DpHpxj, x0,DxjuN,j ,mN,jx q “ 0
´BtuN,i ´
Nÿ
j“0
∆xju
N,i `Hpxi, x0,DxiuN,i,mN,ix q
`Dx0uN,i ¨DpH0px0,Dx0uN,0,mNx q `
ÿ
j‰i, jě1
Dxju
N,i ¨DpHpxj , x0,DxjuN,j,mN,jx q “ 0
uN,0pT,xq “ G0px0,mNx q, uN,ipT,xq “ Gpxi, x0,mN,ix q.
(1)
where x “ px0, . . . , xN q, mNx “
1
N
ÿ
iě1
δxi , m
N,i
x “
1
N ´ 1
ÿ
j‰t0,iu
δxj .
Following [15] for instance, the solution puN,0, uN,1, . . . , uN,N q describes the payoff at equi-
librium of a pN `1q´player stochastic differential game. The particular structure of this system
expresses the fact that the “small” players (for i “ 1, . . . , N) have a symmetric cost function,
giving rise to the same Hamiltonian H. In addition, for a small player i “ 1, . . . , N , the other
players are indistinguishable and appear only through the empirical measure mN,ix in the Hamil-
tonian H of this player. In the same way, the small players are indistinguishable for the large
player: they appear through the empirical measure mN
x
in the Hamiltonian H0 of the large
player. The fact that the players differ in size is expressed by the fact that the position of a
small player i (for i “ 1, . . . , N) enters in the Hamiltonian H0 of the major player and in the
Hamiltonian H of the other small players with a weight 1{N or 1{pN ´ 1q, while the position of
the major player (i.e., for i “ 0) enters in the Hamiltonian H the other players without weight.
Because of the symmetry of system (1) and the uniqueness of its solution, one can check
that uN,0 only depends on pt, x0q and on the empirical measure mNx of the small players while
uN,i depends on pt, xi, x0q and on the empirical measure mN,ix (player i playing a particular role
for vN,i).
So, arguing as in [6], one formally expects, as the number N of small players tends to
infinity, that uN,0 „ U0pt, x0,mNx q, uN,i „ Upt, xi, x0,mN,ix q, where U0, U solve the system of
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master equations:$’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’%
piq ´BtU0 ´∆x0U0 `H0px0,Dx0U0,mq ´
ˆ
Rd
divyDmU
0pt, x0,m, yqdmpyq
`
ˆ
Rd
DmU
0pt, x0,m, yq ¨DpHpy, x0,DxUpt, y, x0,mq,mqdmpyq “ 0
in p0, T q ˆ Rd0 ˆ P2pRdq,
piiq ´BtU ´∆xU ´∆x0U `Hpx, x0,DxU,mq ´
ˆ
Rd
divyDmUpt, x, x0,m, yqdmpyq
`Dx0U ¨DpH0px0,Dx0U0pt, x0,mq,mq
`
ˆ
Rd
DmUpt, x, x0,m, yq ¨DpHpy, x0,DxUpt, y, x0,mq,mqdmpyq “ 0
in p0, T q ˆ Rd ˆ Rd0 ˆ P2pRdq,
piiiq U0pT, x0,mq “ G0px0,mq, in Rd0 ˆ P2pRdq,
pivq UpT, x, x0,mq “ Gpx, x0,mq in Rd ˆ Rd0 ˆ P2pRdq.
(2)
This is a nonlinear equation stated in the space of probability measures P2pRdq of Rd. The
notion of derivative with respect to a measure used in the above system is the same as in [6].
The master equation (without a major agent) was first introduced by Lasry and Lions and
discussed by Lions in [23]. It was later studied in [6, 7, 8, 12, 16] in various degrees of generality.
System (2) is precisely the system (here without common noise, to simplify the expressions)
introduced in [22]. The well-posedness in short time of (2) is stated in [22], a detailed proof
(with a completely different approach) is also contained in our companion paper [7]. The first
goal of the present paper is to show, through a classical verification argument, that (2) yields the
notion of Nash equilibria (in the case of Markovian feedback controls) introduced by Carmona
and al. in [8, 10, 11]: see Proposition 2.2. Then we rigorously prove that the solution of the
Nash system (1) converges to the solution of the system of master equations (2) as the number
of players tends to infinity: see Theorem 3.1. The main interest of this result is that it provides
another justification of the definition. The method of proof follows closely the lines of [6] (see
also [8]), where a similar statement for problems without a major player but with common noise
is established.
1 Notation and assumptions
The state space of the major player is Rd0 (d0 P N, d0 ě 1), the state space for the minor player
is Rd (d P N, d ě 1). Both spaces are endowed with the Euclidean distance | ¨ |.
We denote by PpRdq the set of Borel probability measures on Rd and by PkpRdq, k ě 1, the
set of measures in PpRdq with finite moment of order k: namely,
Mkpmq :“
ˆˆ
Rd
|x|kmpdxq
˙
1{k
ă `8 if m P PkpRdq.
The set PkpRdq is endowed with the distance (see for instance [1, 27, 29])
dkpm,m1q “ inf
pi
ˆˆ
Rd
|x´ y|kπpdx, dyq
˙
1{k
, @m,m1 P PkpRdq,
where the infimum is taken over the couplings π betweenm andm1, i.e., over the Borel probability
measures π on Rd ˆ Rd with first marginal m and second marginal m1.
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Given a map U : P2pRdq Ñ R, the notion of derivative in the space of measures is the one
introduced in [6] and [7]. We say that a map U : P2pRdq Ñ R is C1 is there exists a continuous
and bounded map δU
δm
: P2pRdq ˆ Rd Ñ R such that
Upm1q ´ Upmq “
ˆ
1
0
ˆ
Rd
δU
δm
pp1´ sqm` sm1, yqpm1 ´mqpdyqds @m,m1 P P2pRdq.
We say that the map U is continuously L´differentiable if U is C1 and if y Ñ δU
δm
pm, yq is
everywhere differentiable with a continuous and globally bounded derivative on P2pRdq ˆ Rd.
We denote by
DmUpm, yq :“ Dy δU
δm
pm, yq (3)
this L´derivative.
The Hamiltonians of the problem are H0 : Rd0 ˆRd0 ˆP2pRdq Ñ R for the major player and
H : RdˆRd0 ˆRdˆP2pRdq Ñ R for the minor players. We assume that H0 and H are smooth
enough to justify the computations below. In particular, H0 and H are assumed to be at least
C1 with respect to the measure variable. The maps p0 Ñ H0px0, p0,mq and pÑ Hpx, x0, p,mq
are also assumed to be strictly convex:
D2p0p0H
0px0, p0,mq ą 0, D2ppHpx, x0, p,mq ą 0.
We denote by L0 and L the convex conjugate of H0 and H with respect to the variable p0 and
p respectively:
L0px0, α0,mq “ sup
p0PRd0
´α0 ¨ p0 ´H0px0, p0,mq
and
Lpx, x0, α,mq “ sup
pPRd
´α ¨ p´Hpx, x0, p,mq.
2 Interpretation of the model
In this section, we show that the system (2) of master equations can be interpreted as a Nash
equilibrium in the infinite players’ game with a major player.
Namely we consider the infinite players’ game in which the minor players play closed loop
strategies of the form α “ αpt, x, x0,mq (where x is the position of the minor player, x0 is
the position of the major player and m is the distribution of the minor players), while the
major player plays a closed loop strategy of the form α0 “ α0pt, x0,mq. Here and below,
αpt, x, x0,mq and α0pt, x0,mq are (deterministic) functions which we assume to be bounded and
locally Lipschitz continuous on, respectively, r0, T sˆRdˆRd0ˆP2pRdq and r0, T sˆRd0ˆP2pRdq.
Thus, both the representative minor agent and the major agent are playing feedback strategies.
In particular, given a Brownian motion tB0t u in Rd0 , and a stochastic flow of measures tmtu in
P2pRdq which is adapted to the filtration generated by B0 :“ tB0t u, the dynamics of the major
player will be given by
dX0t “ α0pt,X0t ,mtqdt`
?
2dB0t
while the dynamics of the representative minor player is given by
dXt “ αpt,Xt,X0t ,mtqdt`
?
2dBt ,
where B :“ tBtu is a Brownian motion independent of B0. We stress that the choice of Marko-
vian feedback controls implies that the stochastic controls α0t “ α0pt,X0t ,mtq, and, respectively,
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αt “ αpt,Xt,X0t ,mtq are adapted to the filtrations generated by pB0t q and, respectively, by
pB0t , Btq.
Notice that the stochastic flow of measures mt, which is going to represent the distribution
of the minor agents, must necessarily be adapted to the filtration B0 of the major player. At
equilibrium, mt will be the conditional law given B
0
t of Xt.
The following definition is a reformulation of the definition of [10] by using the stochastic
PDE satisfied by the distribution law mt:
Definition 2.1. Given an initial measure µ0 P P2pRdq and an initial position x00 P Rd0 for
the major player, a Nash equilibrium in the game is a pair pα¯, α¯0q of feedback strategies for the
minor and major player with the following properties:
1. pX¯0t , m¯tq are the flow of positions for the major player and of the mean field for the minor
players generated by α¯ and α¯0, i.e. the solution to the McKean-Vlasov stochastic system:$&
%
dX¯0t “ α¯0pt, X¯0t , m¯tqdt`
?
2dB0t in r0, T s
dtm¯t “
 
∆m¯t ´ divpm¯tα¯pt, x, X¯0t , m¯tqq
(
dt in r0, T s ˆ Rd,
m¯0 “ µ0, X¯00 “ x00.
(4)
2. The feedback strategy α¯ is optimal for each minor player, given pX¯0t , m¯tq, namely
Jpα¯; α¯0, m¯tq ď Jpα; α¯0, m¯tq (5)
for any Markovian feedback control αt :“ αpt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯tq, where
Jpα; α¯0, m¯tq “ E
„ˆ T
0
LpXt, X¯0t , αpt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯tq, m¯tqdt`GpXT , X¯0T , m¯T q

,
with dXt “ αtdt`
?
2dBt, X0 being distributed according to µ0.
3. The feedback strategy α¯0 is optimal for the major player, meaning that
J0pα¯; α¯0q ď J0pα¯;α0q,
for any different feedback law α0pt, x,mq, where
J0pα¯;α0q “ E
„ˆ T
0
L0pX0t , α0t pt,X0t ,mtq,mtqdt`G0pX0T ,mT q

,
where pX0t ,mtq is now the flow of positions for the major player and of the mean field for
the minor players generated by α¯ and α0, i.e., the solution to$&
%
dX0t “ α0pt,X0t ,mtqdt`
?
2dB0t in r0, T s
dtmt “
 
∆mt ´ divpmtα¯pt, x,X0t ,mtqq
(
dt in r0, T s ˆ Rd,
m0 “ µ0, X00 “ x00.
(6)
A few comments on the definition are now in order. We first note that m¯t (and, respectively,
mt) are nothing but the conditional expectation given pX¯0s qsďt of the process X¯t (respectively,
the conditional expectation given pX0s qsďt of Xt), where X¯t, Xt are solutions of the McKean-
Vlasov SDEs
dX¯s “ α¯ps, X¯s, X¯0s ,LpX¯s|X¯0s qqds `
?
2dBs, LpX¯0q “ µ0,
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and, respectively,
dXs “ α¯ps,Xs,X0s ,LpXs|X0s qqds `
?
2dBs, LpX0q “ µ0 .
We stress that, given any couple α¯0pt, x,mq, α¯pt, x, x0,mq of bounded and locally Lipschitz func-
tions, the existence of a (unique) solution pX¯t, m¯tq of the system (4) can be proved with standard
fixed point methods.
The asymmetry between the major and the infinitely many minor players appears clearly
in the above definition of Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the cost for a minor player who deviates
playing a strategy α is Jpα; α¯0, m¯tq because, for this deviating small player, the mean field is
fixed (since the strategies of the other minor players are fixed) as well as the corresponding
strategy of the major player. In contrast, if the major player deviates, the mean field pmtq also
changes because all the minor players react to the deviation. Note that this definition is exactly
the one introduced by Carmona-Wang [10] in their “closed loop version” of Section 2. In fact,
as detailed in [11], the equilibrium defined so far can also be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium
of a two-player differential game by first defining the cost of the small player as Jpα;α0,mtq for
an exogenous stochastic flow of measures and the cost of the major player as J0pα;α0q as above,
and then requiring that the flow mt satisfies, at the Nash equilibrium, the consistency condition
mt “ LpX¯s|X¯0s q.
We now show the link between the system of master equations and the Nash equilibria of
the MFG problem with a major agent.
Proposition 2.2 (Verification). Let pU0, Uq be a classical solution to the system of master
equations (2). Then the pair
pα¯pt, x, x0,mq, α¯0pt, x0,mqq :“ ´pDpHpx, x0,DxUpt, x, x0,mq,mq,DpH0px0,Dx0U0pt, x0,mq,mqq
is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof. Let us first check that (5) holds. For any α, we have, in view of the equation satisfied by
pm¯tq,
dUpt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯tq “
!
BtU `DxU ¨ αpt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯tq `Dx0U ¨ α¯0pt, X¯0t , m¯tq `∆xU `∆x0U
`
ˆ
Rd
divypDmUpt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯t, yqqm¯tpdyq
´
ˆ
Rd
DmUpt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯t, yq ¨DpHpy, X¯0t ,DxUpt, y, X¯0t , m¯tq, m¯tqm¯tpdyq
)
dt
`
?
2
`
DxU ¨ dBt `Dx0U ¨ dB0t
˘
,
where, unless otherwise specified, U and its space derivatives are evaluated at pt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯tq.
Using the equation satisfied by U and the definition of α¯0, we obtain after integration in time
and taking expectation:
E
“
GpXT , X¯0T , m¯T q
‰ “ E “UpT,XT , X¯0T , m¯T q‰
“ E “Up0,X0, x00, µ0q‰`
ˆ T
0
E
“
DxU ¨ α`HpXt, X¯0t ,DxUpt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯tq, m¯tq
‰
dt
ě E “Up0,X0, x00, µ0q‰´
ˆ T
0
E
“
LpXt, X¯0t , αpt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯tq, m¯tq
‰
dt,
6
with an equality if
αpt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯tq “ ´DpHpt,Xt, X¯0t ,DxUpt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯tq, m¯tq “ α¯pt,Xt, X¯0t , m¯tq.
This shows that
Jpα; X¯0t , m¯tq ě E
“
Up0,X0, x00, µ0q
‰ “ Jpα¯; X¯0t , m¯tq,
so that α¯ is optimal.
Next we show the optimality of α¯0. Let α0 be a feedback for the major player, pXt,mtq be
given by (6). Then
dU0pt,X0t ,mtq “
!
BtU0 `Dx0U0 ¨ α0 `∆x0U0 `
ˆ
Rd
divypDmU0pt,X0t ,mt, yqqmtpdyq
´
ˆ
Rd
DmU
0pt,X0t ,mt, yq ¨DpHpy,X0t ,DxUpt, y,X0t ,mtq,mtqmtpdyq
)
dt
`
?
2Dx0U ¨ dB0t ,
where, unless otherwise specified, U0 and its space derivatives are evaluated at pt,X0t ,mtq.
Therefore, in view of the equation satisfied by U0, we have
E
“
G0pX0T ,mT q
‰ “ E “U0pT,X0T ,mT q‰
“ U0p0, x0, µ0q `
ˆ T
0
E
“
Dx0U
0 ¨ α0 `H0pX0t ,Dx0U0pt,X0t ,mtq,mtq
‰
dt
ě U0p0, x0, µ0q ´
ˆ T
0
E
“
L0pX0t , α0pt,X0t ,mtq,mtq
‰
dt,
with an equality if
α0pt,X0t ,mtq “ ´DpH0pt,X0t ,Dx0Upt,X0t ,mtq,mtq “ α¯0pt,X0t ,mtq,
in which case m “ m¯. This shows that
J0pα¯;α0q ě U0p0, x0, µ0q “ J0pα¯; α¯0q
and proves the optimality of α¯0.
3 The mean field limit
In this part we show that the master equation (2) corresponds to the mean field limit of the
N´player game with a major player. We work here with the d1 distance and we assume that
H0, DpH
0, H and DpH are globally Lipschitz continuous in the sense that (for instance for H)
|Hpx, x0, p,mq ´Hpx1, px0q1, p1,m1q| ď Cp|x´ x1| ` |x0 ´ px0q1| ` |p ´ p1| ` d1pm,m1qq
for any x, x1 P Rd, x0, x10 P Rd0 , p, p1 P Rd, m,m1 P P1pRdq. Our main result is the following:
Theorem 3.1. Let puN,iq be a classical solution to the Nash system (1) and pU0, Uq be a
classical solution to the system (2) of master equations. There is a constant C, independent of
N , x P Rd0 ˆ pRdqN and t P r0, T s, such that
ˇˇ
uN,0pt,xq ´ U0pt, x0,mNx q
ˇˇ` sup
i“1,...,N
ˇˇ
uN,ipt,xq ´ Upt, xi, x0,mN,ix q
ˇˇ ď CN´1
˜
1` 1
N
Nÿ
i“1
|xi|
¸
,
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where, as before,
mNx “
1
N
Nÿ
i“1
δxi , m
N,i
x “
1
N ´ 1
ÿ
jRt0,iu
δxj .
As in [6], it is also possible to show that the optimal trajectories associated with theN´player
problem converge to the optimal trajectory for the limit one.
Proof. We follow the strategy of proof of [6]. Let puN,iq be the solution to (1) and pU0, Uq be
the solution of (2). Following [6], we set
vN,0pt,xq “ U0pt, x0,mNx q, vN,ipt,xq “ Upt, xi, x0,mN,ix q.
Let us fix pt0, x00, µ0q P r0, T s ˆ Rd0 ˆ P2pRdq and let pZN,iqiě1 be i.i.d. random variables with
law µ0 P P2pRdq. We consider the system X “ pXN,0,XN,1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,XN,N q of SDEs:
dXN,0s “ ´DpH0pXN,0s ,Dx0uN,0ps,Xsq,mNXsqds `
?
2dB0s , s P rt0, T s,
dXN,is “ ´DpHpXN,is ,XN,0s ,DxiuN,ips,Xsq,mN,iXs qds`
?
2dBis, s P rt0, T s,
X
N,0
t0
“ x00, XN,it0 “ ZN,i.
Let us first notice that the pvN,iq are almost solutions to the Nash system:
Lemma 3.2. For i “ 0, . . . , N , there exist continuous maps rN,i : r0, T s ˆ Rd0`Nd Ñ R such
that$’’’’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’’’’%
´BtvN,0 ´
Nÿ
j“0
∆xjv
N,0 `H0px0,Dx0vN,0,mNx q `
ÿ
jě1
Dxjv
N,0 ¨DpHpxj, x0,DxjvN,j ,mN,jx q “ rN,0
´BtvN,i ´
Nÿ
j“0
∆xjv
N,i `Hpxi, x0,DxivN,i,mN,ix q
`Dx0vN,i ¨DpH0px0,Dx0vN,0,mNx q `
ÿ
j‰i, jě1
Dxjv
N,i ¨DpHpxj , x0,DxjvN,j,mN,jx q “ rN,i
vN,0pT,xq “ G0px0,mNx q, vN,ipT,xq “ Gpxi, x0,mN,ix q.
and
sup
i“0,...,N
}rN,ipt,xq}8 ď C
N
p1`M1pmNx qq.
Recall that M1pmq “
´
Rd
|x|mpdxq is the first order moment of the measure m. We postpone
the proof of the Lemma and proceed with the ongoing proof. The main part of the proof consists
in estimating the difference uN,i ´ vN,i along the trajectory X. For this we set
U
N,i
t “ uN,ipt,XNt q, V N,it “ vN,ipt,XNt q.
We first note that, in view of the equation satisfied by the puN,iq,
dU
N,0
t “
´
BtuN,0 `
ÿ
jě0
∆xju
N,0 ´DpH0pXN,0t ,Dx0uN,0pt,Xtq,mNXtq ¨Dx0uN,0
´
ÿ
jě1
DpHpXN,jt ,XN,0t ,DxjuN,j,mN,jXt q ¨DxjuN,0
¯
dt`
?
2
ÿ
jě0
Dxju
N,0 ¨ dBjt
“ pH0pXN,0t ,Dx0uN,0,mNXtq ´DpH0pXN,0t ,Dx0uN,0,mNXtq ¨Dx0uN,0
`
?
2
ÿ
jě0
Dxju
N,0 ¨ dBjt ,
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where the uN,j are evaluated at pt,XNt q. On the other hand, by Lemma 3.2, we have
dV
N,0
t “ pBtvN,0 `
ÿ
jě0
∆xjv
N,0 ´DpH0pXN,0t ,Dx0uN,0pt,Xtq,mNXtq ¨Dx0vN,0
´
ÿ
jě1
DpHpXN,jt ,XN,0t ,DxjuN,j,mN,jXt q ¨DxjvN,0qdt`
?
2
ÿ
jě0
Dxjv
N,0 ¨ dBjt
“
´
H0pXN,0t ,Dx0vN,0,mNXtq ´DpH0pXN,0t ,Dx0uN,0pt,Xtq,mNXtq ¨Dx0vN,0
´
ÿ
jě1
pDpHpXN,jt ,XN,0t ,DxjuN,j,mN,jXt q ´DpHpX
N,j
t ,X
N,0
t ,Dxjv
N,j ,m
N,j
Xt
qq ¨DxjvN,0
´ rN,0
¯
dt`
?
2
ÿ
jě0
Dxjv
N,0 ¨ dBjt ,
where the uN,j, rN,0 and vN,0 are, here again, evaluated at pt,Xtq. So, for any s P rt0, T s,
pUN,0T ´ V N,0T q2 “ pUN,0s ´ V N,0s q2
`
ˆ T
s
2pUN,0t ´ V N,0t q
´
H0pXN,0t ,Dx0uN,0,mNXtq ´H0pXN,0t ,Dx0vN,0,mNXtq
´DpH0pXN,0t ,Dx0uN,0,mNXtq ¨ pDx0uN,0 ´Dx0vN,0q
`
ÿ
jě1
pDpHpXN,jt ,XN,0t ,DxjuN,j,mN,jXt q ´DpHpX
N,j
t ,X
N,0
t ,Dxjv
N,j ,m
N,j
Xt
qq ¨DxjvN,0
` rN,0
¯
dt` 2
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
|DxjuN,0 ´DxjvN,0|2dt
` 2
?
2
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
pUN,0t ´ V N,0t qpDxjuN,0 ´DxjvN,0q ¨ dBjt .
Note that UN,0T “ V N,0T because the maps uN,0 and vN,0 have the same terminal condition. Using
the global Lipschitz continuity of H0 and H and the fact that }DxjvN,0}8 ď CN´1 for j ě 1,
we infer that
0 ě pUN,0s ´ V N,0s q2
´ C
ˆ T
s
|UN,0t ´ V N,0t |
´
|Dx0puN,0 ´ vN,0q| `N´1
ÿ
jě1
|Dxj puN,j ´ vN,jq| ` |rN,0|
¯
dt
` 2
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
|Dxj puN,0 ´ vN,0q|2dt` 2
?
2
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
puN,0 ´ vN,0qDxj puN,0 ´ vN,0q ¨ dBjt .
Taking the conditional expectation EZ given Z and using Young’s inequality we find, for any
ǫ ą 0,
0 ě EZ “pUN,0s ´ V N,0s q2‰´
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
Cǫ´1|UN,0t ´ V N,0t |2 ` ǫ|Dx0puN,0 ´ vN,0q|2 ` ǫ|rN,0|2
` CǫN´1
ÿ
jě1
|Dxj puN,j ´ vN,jq|2
ı
dt
` 2
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|Dxj puN,0 ´ vN,0q|2
ı
dt. (7)
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Note that the estimate of rN,i in Lemma 3.2 implies that
E
ZrprN,0pt,XNt qq2s ď
C
N2
p1` EZrM1pmNXNt qsq
2,
where, in view of the uniform bound on DpH
0 and DpH, we have
E
ZrM1pmNXNt qs ď Cp1`M1pm
N
Z
qq.
So
E
ZrprN,0pt,XNt qq2s ď
C
N2
p1`M1pmNZ qq2 “
CZ
N2
,
where CZ :“ Cp1`M1pmNZ qq2. Coming back to (7), we find, for ǫ small,
CZǫN
´2 ě EZ “pUN,0s ´ V N,0s q2‰
´ C
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
ǫ´1|UN,0t ´ V N,0t |2 ` ǫN´1
ÿ
jě1
|Dxj puN,j ´ vN,jq|2
ı
dt (8)
`
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|Dxj puN,0 ´ vN,0q|2
ı
dt.
We now make the same computation for i ě 1. We have
dU
N,i
t “
´
BtuN,i `
ÿ
jě0
∆xju
N,i ´DpH0pXN,0t ,Dx0uN,0,mNXtq ¨Dx0uN,i
´
ÿ
jě1
DpHpXN,jt ,XN,0t ,DxjuN,j ,mN,jXt q ¨DxjuN,i
¯
dt`
?
2
ÿ
jě0
Dxju
N,i ¨ dBjt
“ pHpXN,it ,XN,0t ,DxiuN,i,mN,iXt q ´DpHpX
N,i
t ,X
N,0
t ,Dxiu
N,i,m
N,i
Xt
q ¨DxiuN,i
¯
dt
`
?
2
ÿ
jě0
Dxju
N,i ¨ dBjt ,
where the uN,j is evaluated at pt,Xtq. On the other hand, by Lemma 3.2, we have
dV
N,i
t “
´
BtvN,i `
ÿ
jě0
∆xjv
N,i ´DpH0pXN,0t ,Dx0uN,0,mNXtq ¨Dx0vN,i
´
ÿ
jě1
DpHpXN,jt ,XN,0t ,DxjuN,j,mN,jXt q ¨DxjvN,i
¯
dt`
?
2
ÿ
jě0
Dxjv
N,i ¨ dBjt
“
´
HpXN,it ,XN,0t ,DxivN,i,mNXNt q ´DpHpX
N,i
t ,X
N,0
t ,Dxiu
N,i,m
N,i
Xt
q ¨DxivN,i
´ pDpH0pXN,0t ,Dx0uN,0,mNXtq ´DpH0pXN,0t ,Dx0vN,0,mNXtqq ¨Dx0vN,i
´
ÿ
j‰t0,iu
pDpHpXN,jt ,XN,0t ,DxjuN,j,mN,jXt q ´DpHpX
N,j
t ,X
N,0
t ,Dxjv
N,j ,m
N,j
Xt
qq ¨DxjvN,i
´ rN,i
¯
dt`
?
2
ÿ
jě0
Dxjv
N,i ¨ dBjt ,
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where the uN,j, rN,j and vN,j are, here again, evaluated at pt,Xtq. So, for any s P rt0, T s,
pUN,iT ´ V N,iT q2 “ pUN,is ´ V N,is q2
`
ˆ T
s
2pUN,it ´ V N,it q
´
HpXN,it ,XN,0t ,DxiuN,i,mNXtq ´HpXN,it ,XN,0t ,DxivN,i,mNXtq
´DpHpXN,it ,XN,0t ,DxiuN,i,mN,iXt q ¨DxipuN,i ´ vN,iq
´ pDpH0pXN,0t ,Dx0uN,0,mNXtq ´DpH0pXN,0t ,Dx0vN,0,mNXtqq ¨Dx0vN,i
`
ÿ
j‰0,i
pDpHpXN,jt ,XN,0t ,DxjuN,j,mN,jXt q ´DpHpX
N,j
t ,X
N,0
t ,Dxjv
N,j,m
N,j
Xt
qq ¨DxjvN,i
´ rN,i
¯
dt` 2
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
|Dxj puN,i ´ vN,iq|2dt
` 2
?
2
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
pUN,it ´ V N,it qDxj puN,i ´ vN,iq ¨ dBjt .
Since UN,iT “ V N,iT and H0 and H are Lipschitz continuous and since }Dxjvn,i}8 ď CN´1 for
j ‰ t0, iu, we have
0 ě pUN,is ´ V N,is q2
´
ˆ T
s
C|UN,it ´ V N,it |
´
|DxipuN,i ´ vN,iq| ` |Dx0puN,0 ´ vN,0q|
`N´1
ÿ
j‰t0,iu
|Dxj puN,j ´ vN,j | ` |rN,i|
¯
dt
` 2
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
|Dxj puN,i ´ vN,iq|2dt` 2
?
2
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
puN,i ´ vN,iqDxj puN,i ´ vN,iq ¨ dBjt .
Taking expectation and using Young’s inequality and the estimate of rN,i in Lemma 3.2, we
find, for ǫ small enough,
CZǫN
´2 ě EZ “pUN,is ´ V N,is q2‰´ C
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
ǫ´1|UN,it ´ V N,it |2
` ǫ|Dx0puN,0 ´ vN,0q|2 ` ǫN´1
ÿ
j‰t0,iu
|Dxj puN,j ´ vN,jq|2
ı
dt (9)
`
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|Dxj puN,i ´ vN,iq|2
ı
dt.
We add inequalities in (9) for i “ 1, . . . , N with N times inequality (8) to obtain
CZǫN
´1 ě NEZ “pUN,0s ´ V N,0s q2‰`ÿ
iě1
E
Z
“pUN,is ´ V N,is q2‰
´ CNǫ´1
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|UN,0t ´ V N,0t |2
ı
dt` Cǫ´1
ÿ
iě1
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|UN,it ´ V N,it |2
ı
dt
´ CNǫ
ˆ T
s
E
Z
“|Dx0puN,0 ´ vN,0q|2‰ dt´ Cǫÿ
jě1
ˆ T
s
E
Z
“|Dxj puN,j ´ vN,jq|2‰ dt (10)
`N
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|Dxj puN,0 ´ vN,0q|2
ı
dt`
ÿ
iě1,jě0
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|Dxj puN,i ´ vN,iq|2
ı
dt. (11)
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Choosing a last time ǫ small enough, we can absorb the terms in line (10) into the term in line
(11). Then, by Gronwall’s Lemma, we find
NEZ
“pUN,0s ´ V N,0s q2‰`ÿ
iě1
E
Z
“pUN,is ´ V N,is q2‰ (12)
`N
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|DxjpuN,0 ´ vN,0q|2
ı
dt`
ÿ
iě1,jě0
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|Dxj puN,i ´ vN,iq|2
ı
dt ď CZN´1.
We use this inequality to evaluate the second line in (9): for i “ 1, . . . , N we have
CZN
´2 ě EZ “pUN,is ´ V N,is q2‰´Cǫ´1
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|UN,it ´ V N,it |2
ı
dt
`
ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|Dxj puN,i ´ vN,iq|2
ı
dt
and finally obtain, thanks again to Gronwall’s Lemma:
E
Z
“pUN,is ´ V N,is q2‰` ÿ
jě0
ˆ T
s
E
Z
”
|Dxj puN,i ´ vN,iq|2
ı
dt ď CZN´2.
For s “ t0 and in view of the initial condition of the process X, this proves that, P´a.s. and for
any i “ 1, . . . , N ,
|uN,ipt0,Zq ´ vN,ipt0,Zq|2 “ EZ
”
pUN,it0 ´ V N,it0 q2
ı
ď CZN´2
while, for i “ 0, we have by (12):
|uN,0pt0,Zq ´ vN,0pt0,Zq|2 “ EZ
”
pUN,0t0 ´ V N,0t0 q2
ı
ď CZN´2.
If we choose the Zi identically distributed with a positive density and finite first order moment,
we obtain the Theorem by the continuity of uN,i and of U .
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let us recall the following relations, proved in [6, Proposition 6.1.1]. For
i, j ‰ 0 with i ‰ j, we have
Dx0v
N,0pt,xq “ Dx0U0pt, x0,mNx q, DxivN,0pt,xq “
1
N
DmU
0pt, x0,mNx , xiq,
D2xixjv
N,0pt,xq “ 1
N2
D2mmU
0pt, x0,mNx , xi, xjq,
D2xixiv
N,0pt,xq “ 1
N2
D2mmU
0pt, x0,mNx , xi, xiq `
1
N
D2ymU
0pt, x0,mNx , xiq,
where, we recall that DmU
0 depends on one extra variable (see (3)) and consequently, D2mmU
0
depends on two extra variables.
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The corresponding equalities hold for vN,i with i ě 1 (with 1{N replaced by 1{pN ´ 1q). So
´ BtvN,0 ´
Nÿ
j“0
∆xjv
N,0 `H0px0,Dx0vN,0,mNx q `
ÿ
jě1
Dxjv
N,0 ¨DpHpxj , x0,DxjvN,j ,mN,jx q
“ ´BtU0pt, x0,mNx q ´∆x0U0pt, x0,mNx q
´
Nÿ
j“1
Tr
ˆ
1
N2
D2mmU
0pt, x0,mNx , xi, xiq `
1
N
D2ymU
0pt, x0,mNx , xiq
˙
`H0px0,Dx0U0pt, x0,mNx q,mNx q
` 1
N
ÿ
jě1
DmU
0pt, x0,mNx , xjq ¨DpHpxj , x0,DxUpt, xj , x0,mN,jx q,mN,jx q
“ ´BtU0pt, x0,mNx q ´∆x0U0pt, x0,mNx q `H0px0,Dx0U0pt, x0,mNx q,mNx q
`
ˆ
Rd
DmU
0pt, x0,mNx , yq ¨DpHpy, x0,DxjUpt, y, x0,mNx q,mNx qmNx pdyq
´
ˆ
Rd
divyDmU
0pt, x0,mNx , yqmNx pdyq ` rN,0pt,xq “ rN,0pt,xq
thanks to the equation satisfied by U0, where
rN,0pt,xq :“ ´
Nÿ
j“1
1
N2
TrD2mmU
0pt, x0,mNx , xi, xiq ´
1
N
ÿ
jě1
DmU
0pt, x0,mNx , xjqˆ
”
DpHpxj , x0,DxjUpt, xj , x0,mN,jx q,mN,jx q ´DpHpxj , x0,DxjUpt, xj , x0,mNx q,mNx q
ı
.
Note that
1
N
ÿ
jě1
d1pmN,jx ,mNx q ď
1
N2pN ´ 1q
ÿ
jě1
ÿ
i‰0,j
|xi ´ xj | ď C
N
M1pmNx q.
So, by the regularity of U0, U and H, we have
|rN,0pt,xq| ď C
N
p1`M1pmNx qq,
as claimed.
The proof for vN,i goes along the same lines and we omit it.
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